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The idea of constitutional ceiling placed upon the power of the gov-
ernment to tax is nothing new or revolutionary, as we have seventeen
precedents for such a scheme in the form of seventeen States which
have self-imposed limitations in their constitutions on the power to tax.
These limitations are set forth as annual maxima and are of three types:
firstly, a number of mills per dollar of the assessed valuation of all tax-
able property in the state; secondly, a number of cents per hundred
dollars valuation; and thirdly, a percentage rate on the valuation. The
first type is represented by the following States and number of mills
respectively: South Dakota," two mills; Utah,2 two and four-tenths
mills; Oklahoma,3 three and one-half mills; Colorado, 4 four mills; New
Mexico, 5 four mills; North Dakota,6 four mills; Wyoming,7 four mills;
Georgia,s five mills; Louisiana,9 five and one-quarter mills; Idaho,10 ten
mills; and Neveda," fifty mills. The second type is represented by the
following States and numbers of cents respectively: Missouri,' 2 twenty
cents; Texas,13 thirty-five cents; and West Virginia,' 4 one hundred
cents. The third type is represented by the following States and per-
centages respectively: Alabama,15 sixty-five one-hundredths of one per
cent; Arkansas, 16 one per cent; and Michigan, 17 one and one-half per
cent. It will be noted that none of these constitutional ceilings placed
upon the power of a government to tax obtain in any of the Eastern or
New England States.
Great progress has been made in the movement, begun in 1939, to
secure an amendment to the Constitution of the United States limiting
income tax rates to twenty-five per cent in peacetime. The mode of
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
' S.D. CoNsT., 1889, Art. XI, sec. 1.
2 UTAH CONST., 1896, Art. XIII, sec. 7.
3 OKL. C NST., 1907, Art. X, sec. 9.
4 COL. CONST., 1876, Art. X, sec. 11.
5 N.M. CONST., 1911, Art. VIII, sec. 2.
6N.D. CONST., 1889, Art. XI, sec. 174.
7 WYOMING CONST., 1890, Art. XV, sec. 4.
8 GA. CONST., 1945, Art. VII, sec. 1, par. 2, clause 3.
9 LA. CONST., 1921, Art. X, sec. 3.
10 IDAHO CoNsT., 1890, Art. VII, sec. 9.
"1 NEv. CONST., 1864, Art. X, sec. 145.01.
'12 Mo. CONST., 1875, Art. X, sec. 8.
'3 TEx. CONST., 1876, Art. VIII, sec. 9.
14 W. VA. CONST., 1872, Art. X, sec. 1.
'15 ALA. CONST., 1901, Art. XI, sec. 214.
a6 ARK. CoNsT., 1874, Art. XVI, sec. 8.
17 MICH. CoNST., 1908, Art. X, sec. 21.
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amending the Constitution pursued is by State legislatures applying to
the Congress to call a convention proposing amendments. No amend-
ment to the Constitution has been effectuated by the use of this method.
Resolutions in favor of the income tax rate--ceiling amendment me-
morializing the Congress to call a convention have been passed by the
legislatures of twenty-six States-Wyoming, Rhode Island, Mississippi,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Indiana, Arkansas, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin, Alabama, Kentucky, New
Jersey, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah, Kansas and Florida. However, four States-Illinois, 8
Alabama, " Wisconsin"0 and Kentucky2l--subsequently took action to
rescind their respective resolutions.
Rescissions were not effectuated in the foregoing premises for the
following three reasons:
1. New Jersey and Ohio2 were among the States which ratified
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.23 Subsequently, New Jersey and
Ohio2'4 took action to rescind their respective ratifications. However,
after passage of ratifications by the necessary three-fourths States, the
Congress passed a resolution 25 listing the ratifying States and included
New Jersey and Ohio. The Congress transmitted such resolutions to
the Department of State. Secretary of State, William H. Seward, in
pursuance of such resolution and acting under statutory duty, issued
his certification 26 declaring the Fourteenth Amendment an integral part
of the Constitution. In his certification, Secretary of State Seward also
listed the ratifying States and included New Jersey and Ohio.
2. New York was among the States which ratified the proposed
Fifteenth Amendment. Subsequently, New York took action to rescind
her ratification. However, after passage of ratifications by the requisite
three-fourths States, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, acting under
statutory duty, issued his certification 27 declaring the Fifteenth Amend-
ment and integral part of the Constitution. In his certification Secre-
tary of State Fish listed the ratifying States and included New York.
3. In the cases of all but one of the twenty-two amendments to the
Constitution, the Congress directed ratification to be by State legisla-
tures. Only in the case of the Twenty-first Amendment did the Con-
gress direct the ratification to be by State conventions. This exception
Is Ill. Laws, 1945, p. 1797.
29 Ala. Acts, 1945, p. 155.20 Wis. Laws, 1944-45, pp. 1126-27.21 Ky. Acts, 1946, p. 720.
22 Ohio Laws, 1867, pp. 320-21.
23 14 STAT. 358.
24 65 OHIO LAWS 280.
25 15 STAT. 709, 710.
20 15 STAT. 708, 709.
27 16 STAT. 1131; 1132.
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to the general policy historically followed was made seemingly ex in-
dustria. The only feasible reason for the exception is that the Twenty-
First Amendment is the only amendment which repealed a preceding
amendment (the Eighteenth Amendment). The Congress apparently
thought that in order for the States to ratify the proposed Twenty-First
Amendment and thus to rescind the prior action that their respective
legislatures had taken in ratifying the Eighteenth Amendment ratifying
action by an agency closer to the seats of sovereignty-the peoples of
the States themselves-was necessary and, therefore, designated con-
ventions as the mode of ratification.
The text of the resolutions specifies that the limitations upon the
income tax rates ". . . shall, however, be subject to the qualification
that in the event of a war in which the United States is engaged creat-
ing a grave national emergency requiring such action to avoid national
disaster . . ." such limitations may be deferred. The phraseology em-
ployed is broad enough to include "a police action" for in 1941 in the
case of Verano V. De Angelis Coal Co. the District Court of the United
States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that ". . . a formal
declaration of war is not necessary before it can be said that a condition
of war exists...,,"B
The Wyoming legislature passed its resolution twelve years ago.
Mississippi and Rhode Island passed their resolutions eleven years ago.
It might be contended by opponents of the movement to secure the in-
come tax rate-limitation amendment that an unreasonable length of
time has elapsed since passage of the resolutions by Wyoming, Missis-
sippi and Rhode Island and, therefore, the resolutions passed by these
three States no longer can be counted. Such an argument would be
based partly on the holding in the case of Dillon v. Gloss" that Article
V of the Constitution impliedly requires amendments submitted to be
ratified within a reasonable time after proposal; that the Congress may
fix a reasonable time for ratification, and that the period of seven years
fixed by the Congress was reasonable. However, the fallaciousness of
this contention becomes apparent when we consider the following state-
ment by Mr. Justice Van Devanter in the unanimous decision in the
Dillon case: ". . . proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated
acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference
being that they are not to be widely separated in time." 30 Thus, the
reasonable length of time necessary is the interval between proposal and
ratification. The reasonable-length-of-time doctrine is inapplicable to
the movement to secure the income tax rate-ceiling amendment as there
has been no proposal as yet of such income tax rate-limitation amend-
2841 F. Supp. 954, 955 (1941).
29 256 U.S. 368, 41 S.Ct. 510, 65 L.Ed. 994 (1921).30 Ibid., at pp. 374, 375.
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ment. There can be no proposal until the Congress calls a convention,
the convention proposes amendments and the Congress directs the mode
of ratification.
The foregoing contention by opponents of the movement to secure
the income tax rate-ceiling amendment is also based on the dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Butler,31 in which Mr. Justice McReynolds con-
curred,3 2 in 1938 in the case of Coleman v. Miller. Mr. Justice Butler
was of the opinion that the thirteen years intervening between the time
the Congress proposed the child Labor Amendment and the time the
Kansas legislature ratified same constituted an unreasonable length of
time. However, here again, in a dissenting opinion, as in the opinion of
the Court in the Dillon case, the reasonable-length-of-time doctrine is
measured from the time of proposal; and until there is proposal, the
doctrine is inapplicable.
The question arises as to whether under the terms of Article V
when thirty-two State legislatures pass resolutions memorializing the
Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing constitu-
tional amendments it is mandatory or discretionary with the Congress
to call a convention. The authorities are in agreement that under such
circumstances it is mandatory upon the Congress to call a convention.
Professor Henry Rottschaefer stated that amendments ". . . may be
proposed by Congress on its own initiative whenever two-thirds of both
houses shall deem it necessary, or by a convention called for that pur-
pose which Congress is required to call on application of the legislatures
of two-thirds of the States.13 3 Professor Westel Woodbury Willough-
by wrote as follows: "It would appear that the act thus required of Con-
gress is a purely ministerial one in substance, if not in form, and the
obligation to perform it is stated in imperative form by the Constitu-
tion."34 In the words of Article V "The Congress ... on the applica-
tion of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a
convention proposing amendments." As long ago as 1816 it was held
by Mr. Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee35 that the word
"shall" imports the imperative and the mandatory.
There are already outstanding enough State legislatures which have
passed resolutions pertaining to other subject matter so that these added
to the twenty-six State legislatures which have passed resolutions in
favor of the income tax rate-limitation amendment make up the nec-
essary two-thirds States which, according to the term of Article V,
make it imperative for the Congress to call a convention. Before the
31307 U.S. 433, 470, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1938).32 Ibid., at p. 474.
3 3 RoTTsCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 388 (West
Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1939).
34 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 597 (Baker,
Woorhis & Co., N.Y., 1929).
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first State (Wyoming) legislature passed a resolution regarding an in-
come tax rate-ceiling amendment in 1939, there were already outstand-
ing thirty-six State legislatures which had passed resolutions memorial-
izing the Congress to call a convention. The source for this statement
is the compilation showing the applications made from time to time to
the Senate by the legislatures of various States for the calling of a con-
stitutional convention for the purpose of proposing certain amendments
to the Constitution of the United States presented by Senator Tydings
of Maryland during the second session of the seventy-first Congress in
193.' The compilation by Senator Tydings was recognized as authori-
tative, in the report to the New York Bar Association on December 31,
1930 by the Committee of Five (Henry W. Taft, Chairman, Wilbur F.
Earp, Edward G. Griffin, Wesley H. Maider, Roscoe R. Mitchell and
Isaac R. Oeland) to Look into and Report on the General Proposals
Pending in Congress to Amend the Federal Constitution as follows:
"At the Second Session of the 71st Congress, however, Senator Tydings
presented to the Senate a compilation showing all of the applications for
the calling of a constitutional convention which had been made to Con-
gress since the adoption of the Constitution. The statement was printed
as Document No. 78. It seems to show that 36 ... states have filed
petitions. Upon the information contained in Senator Tydings' state-
ment our report is based."37 However, since nine of the thirty-six
States-Arkansas,u California, 9 Kentucky, 40 Minnesota,41 New Jer-
sey,42 Pennsylvania,4  Utah,44 Maine,' 5 and Wyoming'--had passed
only resolutions exclusively concerning the advocating of the direct elec-
tion of United States Senators, the Seventeenth Admendment would
seem to have negated the efficacy of the resolutions by these nine States
and, therefore, to discount these nine States in the matter. This view is
fortified by the following statement by Professor Lester Bernhardt Or-
field: "In 1901 several legislatures petitioned for a convention to con-
sider an amendment for *the popular election of Senators, and by 1909
twenty-six states had petitioned for that purpose. The adoption of the
Seventeenth Admendment would perhaps destroy the effect of these
petitions.147 This view is further fortified by the following excerpt
35 14 U.S. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816).
36 SEN. Doc. 78,'71st Cong., 2d Sess.
3774 CONG. Rzc. 2924, 2925 (1931), 17 A.B.A.J. 143 (1931).
3s Ark. Laws, 1903, p. 483.
39 Cal. Stat., 1903, p. 682.
40 Ky. Acts, 1902, p. 394.
41Minn. Laws, 1901, p. 676.
42 N.J. Laws, 1907, p. 736.
43 Penn. Laws, 1901, p. 860.
"4Utah Laws, 1903, p. 204.
45Maine Laws, 1911.
Wyo. Laws, 1895, p. 298.7 ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 42, 43 (U. of Mich.
Press, Ann Arbor, 1942).
1952]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
from the report to the New York Bar Association on December 31, 1930
by the Committee of Five to Look into and Report on the General Pro-
posals Pending in Congress to Amend the Federal Constitution:
"The petitions for the election of senators by the direct vote
of the people showed a widespread public opinion favorable to
that change. But they were not numerous enough to make it
mandatory upon Congress to call the convention, and Congress
removed the necessity for the convention method by responding
to the prevailing sentiment and itself proposed Amendment
XVII, which was speedily ratified, the ratification being pro-
claimed by the Secretary of State on May 31, 1913. The Com-
mittee, therefore, is of the opinion that as the purpose in filing
the petitions for the popular election of Senators was satisfied
. . . they have become ineffective. If the same conclusion is
doubtful concerning petitions requesting a convention for general
purposes, it is sufficient to say that the deduction of those peti-
tions relating exclusively to the popular election of Senators
would reduce the number of petitioning states substantially
below the required two-thirds."'
Thus, the nine State legislatures which passed only resolutions ex-
clusively dealing with the advocating of the popular election of United
States Senators subtracted from the thirty-six State legislatures which
passed various types of resolutions memorializing the Congress to call a
convention plus the twenty-six States which passed resolutions pertain-
ing to the income tax rate-limitation amendment is a total of fifty-three
States. But, of course, several of the thirty-six States which passed
diverse types of resolutions are among the twenty-six States which
passed resolutions regarding the income tax rate-ceiling amendment.
To be exact, this duplication exists on the part of thirteen States-
Iowa, Michigan, Indiana, Delaware, Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ala-
bama, Nebraska, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, and Kansas. These
thirteen States subtracted from the previous total of fifty-three States
is a total of forty States or eight more States than are required by the
terms of Article V of the Constitution to make it imperative and
mandatory upon the Congress to call a convention for the purpose of
proposing amendments.
A question which arises is whether resolutions which pertain to dif-
ferent subject matter can be counted together for the purpose of secur-
ing the necessary two-thirds States or only resolutions limited exclusive-
ly to the same subject matter can be counted together for the purpose
of securing the requisite two-thirds States. The former view is the one
accepted by the authorities. Professor Lester Bernhardt Orfield stated
that:
"A closely related problem is whether the requests must seek
a convention for identical purposes. Should two-thirds of the
4 8 Supra. note 37.
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legislatures ask a convention for the purpose of a general revi-
sion or for the same specific purpose, there would be no difficulty.
But when one legislature desires a convention for one purpose,
as to prohibit polygamy, another legislature for another purpose,
as to adopt the initiative and referendum, and a third legislature
for a general purpose, there is some doubt whether the prerequi-
site for a call has been met. The better view would seem to be
that the ground of the applications would be immaterial, and
that a demand by two-thirds of the states would conclusively
show a widespread desire for constitutional changes.' '49
Mr. Wayne B. Wheeler, writing in the Illinois Law Review, ex-
pressed the following opinion: ". . . the sufficiency of a general resolu-
tion asking for a convention is unquestionable. Even where thirty-two
state legislatures made application for a convention, each requesting a
different amendment it might be considered sufficient to call a conven-
tion on the ground that they conclusively showed a wide-spread demand
for changes in government . . ."50
A problem which presents itself is whether, in the event of failure
or refusal on the part of the Congress to call a convention for propos-
ing amendments and in the event that the pressure of public opinion
should prove ineffective, the hand of the Congress can be forced in the
matter. Under the foregoing circumstances an action at law of man-
damus in the District Court of the United States would lie against every
member of the Congress. For precedents there are the cases of State v.
Town Council of South Kingstozmtl and Virginia v. West Virginia.r2
In the former the Supreme Court of Rhode Island issued a writ of
mandamus against a municipal quasi-legislative body and in the latter
the Supreme Court of the United States held that it had the power to
issue a writ of mandamus against the West Virginia legislature. In the
former case the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated that:
"... the question is whether the case alleged is a proper one
for the issue of a writ of mandamus. One office of mandamus
is to enforce obedience to statute law. In general, it lies to com-
pel all officers to perform ministerial duties, as well as to compel
subordinate courts to perform judicial duties; but not to compel
the exercise of discretion in any particular way. It is not con-
tended that the duty of the town council in this matter is other
than ministerial. Mandamus is peculiarly the proper remedy
when other specific remedies are wanting. The remedy which a
legislature can provide is to make a law applicable to the case.
When the law is made, it is for the court to enforce it, or to
punish for disobedience of it. In either function it must construe
49 Supra, note 47.
50 Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?, 21 ILL. L. REv. 782, 795
(1927).
5127 A. 509, 22 L.R.A. 65 (1893).
52246 U.S. 565, 603, 604, 38 S.Ct. 400, 62 L.Ed. 883 (1918).
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the statute, i.e. declare what it means. In the present case, if the
law already made imposes a present duty, no further legislation
would make it more imperative. Any legislative act designed as
a remedy must impose ministerial duties upon individuals. The
court must again be resorted to, to compel such individuals to
perform those duties. So that in the last analysis this remedy
by mandamus is the only specific and efficient one, and if it is
not afforded there are no other means which can give to the elec-
tors the opportunity to exercise such rights as the law gives
them."
In the latter case the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that:
"The remedy sought, as we have at the outset seen, is an order
in the nature of mandamus commanding the levy by the legisla-
ture of West Virginia of a tax to pay the judgment. Insofar as
the duty to award that remedy is disputed merely because au-
thority to enforce a judgment against a State may not affect state
power, the contention is adversely disposed of by what we have
said."
Mr. Walter K. Tuller, writing in the North American Review,
stated that:
"Every officer, of whatever branch, is sworn to support and obey
the Constitution, and it is the natural presumption, fully justified
by our history, that none will refuse to obey its mandates as in-
terpreted by that body whose function and duty it is to do so.
"The form of remedy for compelling Congress to act would
seem clearly to be a writ of mandamus. It is believed that such
a proceeding may be instituted by any citizen. Every citizen of
the country has a direct interest that the Constitution shall be
obeyed, and that interest is none the less real and entitled to rec-
ognition and protection by the courts that it is not capable of
financial computation. Indeed, the very fact that he has no other
remedy serves rather, under the established principles governing
its issuance, to emphasize his right to this writ. Since the Con-
stitution does not confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court to issue writs of mandamus (see Marbury vs. Madison,
supra), it would be necessary to commence the action in the
courts of the District of Columbia. It has been settled since the
decision of Kendall vs. United States, supra, that those courts
have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus as an original
proceeding. From the decision there an appeal can be taken to
the Supreme Court of the United States." 53
5 Tuller, A Convention to Anend the Constitution-Why Needed-How It
May Be Obtained, ll'N. Atm. REv. 369, 382, 383 (1911).
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